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ABSTRACT
A result is given for comparing the values of two fixed duration
differential games whose dynamics are described by possibly different
numbers of differential equations over possibly different time intervals,
Roughly speaking, proof of the result makes use of conditions which
allow a certain transformation of the trajectories of one game into
those of the other game to be accomplished. An application is giren
for a certaia class of diffarantial games, and an exa«plo.
*Dept. of Business Administration; University of Illinois in Urbana,
and visiting
Dept. of Applied Mathematics; Technion- Israel Institute of Technology in Haifa.

X' Introduction . In order to ascertain the value of a differential
game it sometimes is fruitful to compare it to another differential game
with simpler structure, and thereby obtain an inequality of the values.
In [4] Rao obtained a result of sucli a type, by making use of certain
correspondences between the two games of interest, and the theory of dif-
ferential inequalities. In [2] Friedman derived a value inequality which
depended on an inequality of Hamiltcniau functions and certain results of
parabolic partial differential equations. Stem in [5] gave bounds on
the value of a certain type of survival game by transforming it into a
game of fixed duration.
In the next section a brief review of the required concepts of dif-
ferential game theory, as in [3], is given. In section 3 the main result
is presented. The result, in essence, is an inequality of the values of
two games with path-functional payoffs v/hen a certain mapping of the
trajectories of one game into those of the other can be accomplished. In
section U^e^artain gencraliattions of the posult are Btatod, Then aa-'-^'^-
applJ.«ation of lihe TEaln result te a snecifle class «f ganies and aa
erample are glren*
2j--£rfJLirainarJLeA. Consider a system of m ordinary differential
equations
(2.1) X = f (t,x,y,2) (t^ 1 t: < T^)
with an initial rendition
(2.2) x(t(j) = Xq.
n G
Denote by Y and Z compact subsets of the Euclidean spaces R and R
respectively. Tne controls y(t) and z(t) are Lebesgue measurable functions
taking values almost everywhere in Y and Z respectively, defined on [tQ,TQ].
We shall consider a payoff of the form

T
(2.3) P(y,z) = g(x(T )) + / ° h(t,x)dt.
A set of assumptions which guarantee a unique solution of (2.1)- (2. 2)
for any pair of controls are the following (see [1] and [3]):
(a) f(t,x,y,z) is continuous on [t^,! ]xR x^xZ.
(b) There exists k(t) e L'(tQ,TQ) sucli r.hat
|f(t,x,y,z)j lk(t)(l + |x|)
for all (t,x,y,z) £ [t^ ,Tq ] x r"" x Y x Z,
(c) For each R > there exists k (t) e L^(tQ,TQ) such that
|f(t,x,y,z) - f(t,x,y,z)j £kj^(t)ix - x|
for all t
€
[t^.Tg], y 6- Y, z 6 Z, ]x{ £ R and [x| <_ R.
Concerning the payoff we shall assume
(d) h(t,x) is continuous on [t„,T^]xR .
(e) g is continuous on R .
The above assumptions guarantee that the payoff functional P(y,z)
is well defined.
T - t
Let n be a positive integer nd 6 = —^ . Denote
n
Ij = a^..^,t_j) for t^ = tg + j6, llJln.
Define Y. and Z, to be the classes of measurable functions on I. which
3 J J
almost everywhere take values in Y and Z respectively.
6 1
Let r '-^ be anv map of Z, x y x Z„ xY„x... x Y, , x Z. into Y^. We112 2 j-1 y i
then call the n-tuple
r* = (r^'\...,r*'")
an upper 5-strategy for y. Similarly, we define an upper 6 -strategy for
z, A , whose components A '-' are maps from Y-^ x Zj^ x Y2 x Z^x ••• ^Z._ x Y
.
into Z
.

For (2 < i < n) let T, . be any map from Y, ^ Z, x Y„ x Z-X... x y. x z. ,
- —
^,3
J f 112 2 3-1 j-1
into Y , and let F. be. any element of Y,. We then call the n-tuple
J ° »1
r^ =
^'^b-.i-'-'^^.n^
a lower 6-strategy for y. Analogously one defines a lower (S-strategy A.
for z.
Given a pair (Uf,r ) we uniquely obtain control functions (z<-»y )»
5 iS 6.
and a trajectory x . (Zr,y ) is called the outcome of (A,.,r ). Analogously,
a pair (T^.A ) yields an outcome (yj-»z ) and a trajectory x..
The upper 6-value is the ntmiber
V = inf sup inf sup...inf sup P[A. ,r ],
A,
,
r^'^ A,
,
r^- &, r*'^6,1 0,2 ,n
and the lower 6-value is defined by
V. = sup inf sup inf... sup inf P[r.,A ].
6,1 0,2 ,n
We say the differential game has value V if the limits lira V. = V
6->0 °
6 + ~ +
and lim V = V exist end are equal. V and V are called the lower and
6->-0
upper values respectiv^ely.
A result, proven in [3.], whicbi we will make use of is the following:
Theorem 2.1 . Leir. (."'-(e) hold. Then
(2.4) V = inf sup P[i^,r'^j = sup inf P^A^.T ],
-,6 „6 .
A ^x r r A.and 6 o
(2.5) V^ = sup inf P[r.,A ] = inf sup P[r.,A ].
^6^ ^ ^6
We now state an assumption on the form of the dynami..
.
(f) f(t,x,y,z) = fj(t,x,y) + f2(t,x,z).
In [3] the following theorem's proof may be found.

Theorem 2.2. Let (a)-(e) hold . Then
(1) V"^ and V" exist.
(ii) If also (f ) holds then v"^ = V~ = V.
jj. MaJTi results.. In this section we will derive a theorem for com-
paring the values of two differential games G and G, The gnme G has for
its dynamics a system of n differential equations given by
(3.1) X = fj(t,x,y) + fjCt.x.z) (to < f- 1 Tg)
and an initial condition
(3.2) xit^) = Xq.
The control sets Y and Z are subsets of R and R respectively, and the
payoff is given by P(y,z) as in expression (2.3).
The game G has its dynamics described by a system of m differential
equations on an interval [t.jTj.]
(3.3) X = fj(r,x,y) + f^Ct.x.y) (t^ 1 t < f^)
with initial condition
(3.4) x(tQ) = Xq.
The control sets Y a^d Z are subsets of Euclidean spaces R and R*^ respec-
tively, rne payoff for G is given by
(3.5) fG~) - i[K(T.)) + /:0 h(t,x)di
Let Rq denote a bound in the sup-norm on the trajectories of game G;
that is, |x(t)! <_ R for all t € [t .,T ] for any possible path x(t) , where
I j
denotes the Euclidean norm. For game G a number Rj. is similarly defined.
Let q:[tQ,Tp] -+ [t^jT^] be continuously differentiable function whose
derivative satisfies q'(t) > H on [t.^f.].

5n denotes an (m xm) constant matrix. (Ge»er«lization« follow i» saotloit U«)
The following elementary lemma will be useful.
Lemma 3.1
.
Let (a)-(c) hold and assume that Xq =JnxQ. Let
{y(t),z(t),x(t)} and {y(t) ,z(c) ,x(t)} be triples of controls and corres-
ponding paths for games G and G respectively . j|f^
(3.6) fi(;t.x(t),y(t)) = q'(i)3]If^(q(t),x(q(t)),y(q(t)))
and
(3.7) f2(t,x(t),i(t)) = q'(t)3l(f2(q(t),x(q(t)).z(q(t)))
then it follows that
(3.8) x(t) = 5llx(q(t)) (toltlTg).
Proof . By the chain-rule we have
(3.9) ^?!lx(q(t)) = q'(t)5ll[f^(q(t),x(q(0),y(q(t)))
+ f,{q(t),x(q(t)),z(q(t)])].
Upon making the identifications (3.6) and (3.7), (3.8) easily follows.
Now we introduce the following condition;
(L) f-Cfj) is uniformly Lipschitz con!:inuous in x on
Ito,To]x{jxi < Rq}xy ([t,^,Tj^]x{|xi < Rq} xZ) and
f (f ) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x on
Eto>To]x{|xi lRo}xY ([i^,TQ]x{ix| < RqXZ).
The following conditions will be required:
(Cj) Given t e [t^jT^], x <=; R such that |x| <_ R , x 6 R™ such that
|x| £ Rq , and y e Y, there exists y e Y such that
f^(t,x,y) = q'(t)Jllfj(q(t),x,y).
(C^) Given t 6 [t ,T ] , x 6 r" such that |x| £ Rq , x e r" such that
ix| jI.Rq, and z e Z, there exists z 6 Z such that

f2(t,X,z) = q'(t) 3lif2(q(t),x,z).
-
(C3) g(x(Tjj)) £ g(x(TQ)) for all attainable end-states x(Tq) and
x(Tq) for G and G respectively.
(C^) /^° h(t,x(t))dt < /'^° h(t,?nx(q(t)))dt for all paths x(t) of
game G.
Our main result is the following:
Theorem 3.1 . Let the games G and G satisfy (a)-(f ) . Assume x-. =
JJXq and let (L) , (Cj)-(Cj^) hold . Then
(3.10) V(G) <_ V(G),
where V(G) denotes the value of G and V(G) that of G.
— T — t —
Proof. Let n be a positive integer and 6 = . Let I. =
n J
(t. 1 >t ,) as in section 2, j = l,2,...,n. Also define intervals I. =
(t ^,t.) = (q(t
._, ) ,q(t )J , j = 1,2 n. Call the partition corresponding
J J J J
to the latter subdivision it, and denote by |it| its mesh. Analogously to
6-strategies, one can in the obvious way define ir-strategies. Analogously
- + TT
to V (G) and V (G) , numbers V (G) and V (G) can be defined. Also, under
the assumptions of Theorem 2.2, V (G) and V (G) converge to V(G) for any
sequence of partitions {Tr}such that |Tr| -> 0. (See [3], p. 32.)
Let r be an arbitrary lower ir-strategy for player y in game G, and
let At be an arbitrary lower 6-strategy for player z in game G. Here 6
and TT are understood to be related as above. Let e > be arbitrary.
Suppose we can find controls z(t) and y(t) such that
(3.11) P(r„,z) < P(A;r,9) + e.
Upon letting 6 ->- 0, Theorems 2.1, 2.2 and the remarks of the preceding

paragraph th n yield the desired result, since e is arbitrary. The re-
mainder of t e proof will be a construction of these controls. In view of
(C3),(C^), 1 mma 3.1, and the fact that Xq = JRxq, (3.11) will hold if
x(t) =Jnx(q( )) for all t e [tQ,!^] where x is the trajectory corresponding
to (A-r,y) wh le X is the trajectory corresponding to (r ,z). By assumptiq^j^
(d) it folio s that (3.11) will hold if, for prescribed y(c) >
(3.12) |x(t) -Jlix(q(t))| < Y(e) for all t e ft^.f^].
P
Siibdivi e I, into intervals S, = (t
,
jt, ) such that [J S, = I^.
k=l
Make the rel ted subdivision S, of the interval Ij, using the correspondence
r dete mines a control y . (t) on I, and A-r determines a control
TT 1T,1 J-
ZT(t) on Ij. Using (Cj^) we may choose a control y(t) on S^ such that
(3.13) i(i,Xo,y(t)) = q'(H)5lIfj(q(0,Xo,y^^3^(q(t)))
and by (C2) z(t) on S, may be chosen so that
(3.14) ^{1,Kq,Z-^^^(X)] = q'(t) nfjqil),x^,z[q(.l)]).
Continuing i this way, choose y(t) on S and z(t) on S, , k = 2,3,...,p,
such that
(3.15) fj t,x(tj^_^),y(t)) = q'(t) 3nfifq(t),x(tj^_j^),y^^^(q(E)])
and
(3.16) f2 t,x(tj^_^).Z^^^(t)J = q'(t) JRf2Cq(t),x(tj^_^),z[q(t))).
There i a positive constant C such that
(3.17) l^^'^k^ " '^^^k-l^' -^ meas. S,
and
(3.18) l^^^k^ ~ ^^^k-l^l - ^ ^^^^' S

for k = 1,2,..., p. (See [3] for details of (3.17) ,(3.18)
.
)
Using now the assumption (L) , it follows that for some positive D,
independent of partitions S and S we have
(3.19) |fi(t,x(0.y(E)) - q'(OJlif^(q(t),x{q(t)},y^^^(q(E)))|
.
< D(meas. S, + meas. S, )
and
(3.20) \f^[lMt),z-^^^(.l)) - q'(t)Mf2(q(t),x(q(t)),2(q(i)))|
<^ D(meas. S, + meas. S, )
for t f S, . Thus, by choosing sufficiently fine partitions S and S, of
I, and I, respectively we can guarantee |x(t) - }llx(q(t))| <^ IILL holds
on Ij. The procedure is continued in the remaining intervals I. and I.,
j = 2,3,...,n, and thus (3.12) follows.
4. Generalizations and an example . Certain extensions of Theorem 3.1
now follow.
(i) The condition (L) can be removed. This follows from the fact that
if (L) does not hold, f , f , f and f can be uniformly approximated on
their respective domains by functions which satisfy (L) as well as (a)-(c).
By arguments in [2] and [3], if {f^}, {fg},^^)* 1^2^ ^^^ sequences of
functions satisfying (a),(b),(c) and (.L) such that
f -* f uniformly on [t ,T ]x{jx| <_ R } x y x Z
f 2 -*- f^ uniformly on [t^ ,Tq ]x{ | x| £ R^} x y x Z
f" ^- f ^ uniformly on [tQ,TQ]x{|x| 5. RqI^'YxZ
•?n
then
f^ ^ f^ uniformly on [tQ,Tg]x{|x[ < R^} x yx Z
V"(G) * V(G)
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and
V^(G) -> V(G)
where v (G) is the value of the differential game corresponding to (3.2),
(2.3) and dynamics x = f, + f^, and where V (G) is the value of the game
corresponding to (3. A), (3. 5) and dynamics x = f ^ + f^.
(ii) Suppose now that IK = 5ll(t); in particular assume each entry In^
the matrix is a continuously differentiable function. Denote the Jacoblan
of Jll(t) by 311' (t). Theorem (3.1) will still be true if we modify (C^) and
(C.) as follows:
(C^)' Given t 6 [^^,7^], x 6 R™ such that ix| _< Rq , x e R™ such that
|x| £ Rq , and y € Y, there exists y €: Y such that
f^(t.x,y) = q'(t)Jll(t)fi(q(t),x,y) +3ll'(t)x.
(C )' Given t € [t^.T^], x e r"* such that jx[ 1 Rq , x & r" such that
|x| £ Rq , and z € Z, there exists z 6 Z such that
f2(t,x,z) = q'(t)3K(t)fJq(t),x,z} +}R'(t)x.
(iii) Suppose (f) does not hold. If we replace (C,) and (C,) by the
condition
(C ) Given t 6 [t^,!.], x e R such that |x| <_ R , x e R such that
|x| £ Rq . y ^ Y, and z 6 Z, then there exist y € Y and z 6 Z such that
f(t,x,y,z) = q'(t)3ll(Of(q(t).x,y,z) + JH' (t)x.
then the proof of Theorem 3.1 yields the following:
V'^(G) <_ V^(G)
and
V"(G) < V"(G).
(If the lower and upper Hamiltonians for G are equal, and also for G, then
the values exist even in the absence of condition (f) — see [2] for
terminology.)
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(ir) If TTlCor ?nCt) as in (ii) above) is a nsnlinear but continuouslj
differentlable mapping of R into R then assumptions (C, ), (C^)
and (C^) can be modified in the obYious way ee as t© yield Theere» 3,1
alse in this case.
We will new apply TheoreB 3.1 te a specific class of diffeaeatlal
games. Suppose that the gane G with dynajnias C3.3)~(3aU) has a payeff af
the fer»
r,z) - 1 w(U.l) P(y,2 (t)»p(7rix(t))dt
^ere w(t) > 0, Let q(t) denote a solution te the differential equation
w(q(I))*q'{^) " 1 on some interval \\ » T^j subject to q(t|, ) ° t^ and
q(f, ) - T,
,
if such a solution can be found. Consider now the payoff for
cwnparison game G,te be given by
(U.2) P(y,i) = i p(x(t))dt
If (3.8) holds, then P(y,7.) - P(y,z), as easily verified. Thus in order te
apply Theore» 3.1, one needs to determine dynamics and control sets for'G
se as to satisfy conditiens (G, } aad (C^).
exeaple « In the following example in « 2, G has dynairaics given by
^^) = (i)
and the payoff is given by
P(y,z) - tCx^Ct) + x^(t))dt.
Y is the interval f-^ J\ and Z is the interval M>M • For the comparison
game G we take P(y,z) j x dt and dynamics
Letting 7n- (^ 'J) > q(t) - Jlf, Y-t^] and Z^f'.^we have V(G)*VC5) -^ .
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